My first thought is that it may not be necessary to take a decision on something so important (and expensive) in such a short timescale. Once the decision is made to proceed with the replacement of the submarine fleet, the future shape of this element of Britain’s defence policy is determined for decades into the future. However, as we all accept, the world is a highly volatile place, and just as the shape of the world was transformed with unexpected speed at the end of the Cold War, and again post 9/11, so it can change again. It seems to me to be entirely rational to avoid rushed decision making, and to allow plenty of time to debate the options for our future defence policy.

Secondly, there can be no doubt that the major challenge facing us is to halt the spread of nuclear weapons into states which do not already have a nuclear capability. Whilst I am not personally convinced that a decision to scale down Britain’s nuclear capability would act as any kind of moral influence on the more hard-line states with nuclear ambitions, I can’t see that a major upgrade of British capacity would encourage other states to abandon those ambitions either. Britain has taken a global lead on key issues such as international development/debt relief, and climate change- it would be good to see us take a similar lead on the next phase of disarmament and non-proliferation talks. However, I cannot see this being easily done at the same time as a £20+ billion submarine and missile renewal system.

Third, whilst I accept that there may be some substance to the theory of deterrence. I remain to be persuaded that the huge nuclear payload within the Trident system (even allowing for the downscaling announced by the Government at the time of the launch of the consultation paper) is essential for the purposes of deterrence essential to our national security.

And finally, in the context of the argument on deterrence, it seems to me that the gravest danger now lies in the spread of nuclear weapons technology to non-state organisations, acting on behalf of belligerent regimes, but not necessarily traceable back to them. This undermines traditional theories of deterrence, and further reinforces the case for urgent initiatives to halt nuclear proliferation.

Given the serious challenges facing the world, I am not arguing for the straight switch of the Trident budget into non-military expenditure. Pressing as the case is for further work in tackling poverty at home and abroad, and strong though the argument may be that such investment helps tackle the underlying causes of conflict, I suspect that we will face military and security challenges into the future as well, and we need to be prepared for them. Whilst I did not support the invasion of Iraq (above all, as it occurred, prior to the driving through of a sustainable peace in Israel/Palestine), I acknowledge the case for military action in Afghanistan, and broadly supported the actions in Kosovo and Sierra Leone. I would also strongly support an (African led, but internationally backed and funded) peace-keeping operation in Darfur. We need, and will continue to need, a high quality, flexible military capacity, into the future, perhaps even with greater capacity than at present. We should be making the case for extra investment in the areas where it is needed on their own merits, and be prepared to say how these should be funded (taxes, cuts in other budgets), without necessarily reaching for the relatively comfortable target of military spending in an uncertain world.

However, this does not, of itself, justify the Trident system which is the decision in front of us now.

Taking all these issues into consideration, I think it highly unlikely that I will be able to vote for the replacement of Trident along the lines set out in the government White Paper.

E-mail your thoughts on Trident to Karen